Spatio-temporal characterization of synchrophasor data against spoofing attacks in smart grids

Yi Cui, Feifei Bai, Yilu Liu, Peter L. Fuhr, Marissa E. Morales-Rodríguez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

41 Scopus citations

Abstract

“Source ID Mix” has emerged as a new type of highly deceiving attack which can alter the source information of synchrophasor data measured by multiple phasor measurement units(PMUs), thereby paralyzing many wide-area measurement systems(WAMS) applications. To address such sophisticated cyber attacks, we have exploited the spatio-temporal characteristics of synchrophasor data for authenticating measurements’ source information. Specifically, the source authentication is performed when the measurements are subjected to three types of spoofing attacks. Some practical difficulties in applying the proposed method on real-time authentication caused by insufficient measurement data have also been solved. Experimental results with real synchrophasor measurements have validated the effectiveness of the proposed method in detecting such complicated data spoofing and improving power systems’ cyber security.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5807-5818
Number of pages12
JournalIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Volume10
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

Funding

This work was supported primarily by the Engineering Research Centre Program of the National Science Foundation and the Department of Energy under NSF Award Number EEC-1041877 and the CURENT Industry Partnership Program.

Keywords

  • Cyber security
  • Machine learning
  • Phasor measurement unit (PMU)
  • Spoofing attack
  • Wide-area measurement systems (WAMS)

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