Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies

Alex McAvoy, Benjamin Allen, Martin A. Nowak

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

68 Scopus citations

Abstract

Prosocial behaviours are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner’s dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning that all individuals have the same number of interaction partners or that the social good is of one particular type. Here, we explore general evolutionary dynamics for arbitrary spatial structures and social goods. We find that heterogeneous networks, in which some individuals have many more interaction partners than others, can enhance the evolution of prosocial behaviours. However, they often accumulate most of the benefits in the hands of a few highly connected individuals, while many others receive low or negative payoff. Surprisingly, selection can favour producers of social goods even if the total costs exceed the total benefits. In summary, heterogeneous structures have the ability to strongly promote the emergence of prosocial behaviours, but they also create the possibility of generating large inequality.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)819-831
Number of pages13
JournalNature Human Behaviour
Volume4
Issue number8
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2020
Externally publishedYes

Funding

We thank J. Plotkin for constructive feedback and B. Fotouhi and C. Hilbe for helpful conversations. This work was supported by the Army Research Laboratory (grant W911NF-18-2-0265), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (grant OPP1148627), the John Templeton Foundation (grant 61443), the National Science Foundation (grant DMS-1715315), and the Office of Naval Research (grant N00014-16-1-2914). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

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