Nuclear weapons identification system

J. T. Mihalczo; V. K. Pare; T. E. Valentine

Nuclear weapons identification system

J. T. Mihalczo, V. K. Pare, T. E. Valentine

Rad Safety Info Computational Center

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

A nuclear weapons identification system (NWIS) has been under development at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant since 1984. NWlS employs active neutron interrogation to obtain a variety of time and frequency analysis signature to identify nuclear weapons in containers. Advantages of NWlS are (1) high sensitivity {small changes in configurations produce large changes in signatures}; (2) insensitivity of some signatures to background radiation, {useful for storage configurations or for tracking of secondaries through the first stage of dismantlement since the presence of the primary on the assembled system does not affect some signatures for the secondary}; (3) nonintrusive {does not reveal design information, which makes it useful for bilateral treaties or by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)}; and (4) very difficult to deceive.

Original language	English
Pages	44-45
Number of pages	2
State	Published - 1996
Event	Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium. Part 1 (of 3) - Anaheim, CA, USA Duration: Nov 2 1996 → Nov 9 1996

Conference

Conference	Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium. Part 1 (of 3)
City	Anaheim, CA, USA
Period	11/2/96 → 11/9/96

Cite this

@conference{2c8972f99253419e9a043ebbae24fc0a,

title = "Nuclear weapons identification system",

abstract = "A nuclear weapons identification system (NWIS) has been under development at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant since 1984. NWlS employs active neutron interrogation to obtain a variety of time and frequency analysis signature to identify nuclear weapons in containers. Advantages of NWlS are (1) high sensitivity {small changes in configurations produce large changes in signatures}; (2) insensitivity of some signatures to background radiation, {useful for storage configurations or for tracking of secondaries through the first stage of dismantlement since the presence of the primary on the assembled system does not affect some signatures for the secondary}; (3) nonintrusive {does not reveal design information, which makes it useful for bilateral treaties or by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)}; and (4) very difficult to deceive.",

author = "Mihalczo, {J. T.} and Pare, {V. K.} and Valentine, {T. E.}",

year = "1996",

language = "English",

pages = "44--45",

note = "Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium. Part 1 (of 3) ; Conference date: 02-11-1996 Through 09-11-1996",

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TY - CONF

T1 - Nuclear weapons identification system

AU - Mihalczo, J. T.

AU - Pare, V. K.

AU - Valentine, T. E.

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - A nuclear weapons identification system (NWIS) has been under development at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant since 1984. NWlS employs active neutron interrogation to obtain a variety of time and frequency analysis signature to identify nuclear weapons in containers. Advantages of NWlS are (1) high sensitivity {small changes in configurations produce large changes in signatures}; (2) insensitivity of some signatures to background radiation, {useful for storage configurations or for tracking of secondaries through the first stage of dismantlement since the presence of the primary on the assembled system does not affect some signatures for the secondary}; (3) nonintrusive {does not reveal design information, which makes it useful for bilateral treaties or by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)}; and (4) very difficult to deceive.

AB - A nuclear weapons identification system (NWIS) has been under development at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant since 1984. NWlS employs active neutron interrogation to obtain a variety of time and frequency analysis signature to identify nuclear weapons in containers. Advantages of NWlS are (1) high sensitivity {small changes in configurations produce large changes in signatures}; (2) insensitivity of some signatures to background radiation, {useful for storage configurations or for tracking of secondaries through the first stage of dismantlement since the presence of the primary on the assembled system does not affect some signatures for the secondary}; (3) nonintrusive {does not reveal design information, which makes it useful for bilateral treaties or by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)}; and (4) very difficult to deceive.

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M3 - Paper

AN - SCOPUS:0030369627

SP - 44

EP - 45

T2 - Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium. Part 1 (of 3)

Y2 - 2 November 1996 through 9 November 1996

ER -

Nuclear weapons identification system

Abstract

Conference

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