Nonintrusive nuclear weapons/component identification system for international inspections

John T. Mihalczo, Timothy E. Valentine, Jim A. Mullens

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract

The data presented in this paper show how nuclear weapons identification system signatures can be used to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons components in containers in a nonintrusive way so as not to reveal design information and to track them for nuclear material control and accountability. This active neutron interrogation method is particularly useful for components of highly enriched uranium (HEU) where induced fission from 252Cf neutrons produce a signature that can be used to identify the presence of HEU and the configurations of material. Nonintrusive displays of ratios of signatures can be used for making comparisons. Use of the Mahalanobis distance (average deviation of data in units of standard deviation) allows comparisons without display of data at all.

Original languageEnglish
Pages337
Number of pages1
StatePublished - 1997
EventProceedings of the 1997 5th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, ICONE5 - Nice, Fr
Duration: May 25 1997May 29 1997

Conference

ConferenceProceedings of the 1997 5th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, ICONE5
CityNice, Fr
Period05/25/9705/29/97

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