TY - JOUR
T1 - Investigations of active interrogation techniques to detect special nuclear material in maritime environments
T2 - Standoff interrogation of small- and medium-sized cargo ships
AU - Miller, Thomas M.
AU - Patton, Bruce W.
AU - Grogan, Brandon R.
AU - Henkel, James J.
AU - Murphy, Brian D.
AU - Johnson, Jeffrey O.
AU - Mihalczo, John T.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - In this work, several active interrogation (AI) sources are evaluated to determine their usefulness in detecting the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) in fishing trawlers, small cargo transport ships, and luxury yachts at large standoff distances from the AI source and detector. This evaluation is performed via computational analysis applying Monte Carlo methods with advanced variance reduction techniques. The goal is to determine the AI source strength required to detect the presence of SNM. The general conclusion of this study is that AI is not reliable when SNM is heavily shielded and not tightly coupled geometrically with the source and detector, to the point that AI should not be considered a via interrogation option in these scenarios. More specifically, when SNM is shielded by hydrogenous material large AI source strengths are required if detection is based on neutrons, which is not surprising. However, if the SNM is shielded by high-Z material the required AI source strengths are not significantly different if detection is based on neutrons or photons, which is somewhat surprising. Furthermore, some of the required AI source strengths that were calculated are very large. These results coupled with the realities of two ships moving independently at sea and other assumptions made during this analysis make the use of standoff AI in the maritime environment impractical.
AB - In this work, several active interrogation (AI) sources are evaluated to determine their usefulness in detecting the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) in fishing trawlers, small cargo transport ships, and luxury yachts at large standoff distances from the AI source and detector. This evaluation is performed via computational analysis applying Monte Carlo methods with advanced variance reduction techniques. The goal is to determine the AI source strength required to detect the presence of SNM. The general conclusion of this study is that AI is not reliable when SNM is heavily shielded and not tightly coupled geometrically with the source and detector, to the point that AI should not be considered a via interrogation option in these scenarios. More specifically, when SNM is shielded by hydrogenous material large AI source strengths are required if detection is based on neutrons, which is not surprising. However, if the SNM is shielded by high-Z material the required AI source strengths are not significantly different if detection is based on neutrons or photons, which is somewhat surprising. Furthermore, some of the required AI source strengths that were calculated are very large. These results coupled with the realities of two ships moving independently at sea and other assumptions made during this analysis make the use of standoff AI in the maritime environment impractical.
KW - Active interrogation
KW - Monte Carlo
KW - Nonproliferation
KW - Nuclear materials detection
KW - Standoff interrogation
KW - Variance reduction
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84884340357&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.nimb.2013.08.040
DO - 10.1016/j.nimb.2013.08.040
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84884340357
SN - 0168-583X
VL - 316
SP - 94
EP - 104
JO - Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, Section B: Beam Interactions with Materials and Atoms
JF - Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, Section B: Beam Interactions with Materials and Atoms
ER -