Abstract
Neutron coincidence counting is a well-established technique used for the nondestructive quantification of special nuclear material during international safeguards inspections. The neutron counters are commonly designed with an annular body, centered about an inner well or cavity into which a measurement item is placed, and the moderating annulus is populated with 3He tubes connected to a varying number of preamplifiers. The Canberra Industries JAB-01 preamplifier/amplifier/discriminator board is employed within the company's neutron coincidence counters, built for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Non-ideal behavior of these boards was identified during a detector characterization, using list mode data acquisition, of a Canberra Industries JCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar implementing four JAB-01 boards. List mode data acquisition and analysis reveals features that have commonly been overlooked by historic timing gate selection while using shift register data acquisition methods, which are routinely adopted in international safeguards. It has been shown that double pulsing effects are not fully captured within the predelay setting; therefore, they may influence the response of the system within the standard operating regime. We set out to identify and correct for double pulsing in our post analysis of neutron pulse trains, while isolating this behavior to the relevant system. To understand and potentially address these concerns, the responses of two different JAB-01 board systems – the JCC-71 Neutron Coincidence Collar and a modified JCC-51 Active Well Neutron Coincidence Counter – are compared with the responses of an AnTech Inc. N2071 Neutron Coincidence Collar that also uses an amplifier built on the Amptek A111 Charge Sensitive Preamplifier & Discriminator chip, and a JCC-71 that employs custom preamplifiers designed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 161355 |
Journal | Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment |
Volume | 954 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 21 2020 |
Funding
This material is based upon work supported by the US Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D, and through the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium under Award Number DE-NA0003180. This paper was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the US Government. Neither the US government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or limited, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the US government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the US government or any agency thereof. This material is based upon work supported by the US Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D , and through the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium under Award Number DE-NA0003180 . This paper was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the US Government. Neither the US government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or limited, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the US government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the US government or any agency thereof.
Funders | Funder number |
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US Department of Energy | |
U.S. Department of Energy | |
National Nuclear Security Administration | |
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation | DE-NA0003180 |
Government of South Australia |
Keywords
- Double pulsing
- List mode
- Neutron coincidence counter
- Non-ideal behavior
- Preamplifier
- Safeguards