Institutionalizing safeguards by design for nuclear facilities

Safeguards for nuclear facilities could be significantly improved by developing and implementing methods of integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized in a country's regulatory structure similarly to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved for ensuring the reliable safe operation of nuclear facilities would reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state levels. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.