Improved safeguards efficiencies through continuous item monitoring at gas centrifuge enrichment plants

This paper describes how continuous item monitoring improves the efficiency of applying safeguards at a uranium gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) and significantly complicates diversion scenarios for potential proliferators. The handling and movement of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) cylinders is used as an example to show how this can be achieved. Domestic regulations require that facility operators implement effective nuclear material accounting and control measures to track nuclear material in these cylinders. In many instances, these measures involve manual entry of characteristic cylinder identification data into logbooks or computer databases. This approach is problematic because of the potential for error inherent in the manual entry process. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on time consuming manual cylinder inventorying techniques to verify operator declarations. A dynamic, real-time system that continuously monitors these cylinders would provide IAEA inspectors fast and easy access to cylinder information. Such a system could also be integrated with accountability weight values and would facilitate automated "mailbox" declarations that, along with Short Notice Random Inspections, are a new method of improving the effectiveness of safeguards at GCEPs. This would allow the IAEA an automated independent means of verifying cylinder processing information against the operator's declaration which could greatly improve efficiency in cylinder verification. This would help the IAEA identify false or misreported cylinder tare weights, unauthorized cylinder manipulations, concealment of excess production, utilization of undeclared cylinders, and misrepresentation of the cylinders contents.