Game-Theoretic Approach for Electricity Pricing between Distribution System Operator and Load Aggregators

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3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Transactive energy has emerged and gained more and more attention in recent years. Electricity pricing strategies play a critical role in influencing and shaping the customers' energy load profile. In this paper, we investigate the electricity pricing strategy between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) by adopting a bilevel Stackelberg game approach. With the purpose of maximizing its own operating revenue as well as better serving its customers, the upper level DSO will determine electricity prices while considering how lower level LAs will respond to it. Peak-to-average ratio of the total demand could be limited by a preferred value, and peak load is penalized at the upper optimization level. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game approach in leveraging flexible demand potential to benefit both DSO and LAs.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2019 3rd International Conference on Smart Grid and Smart Cities, ICSGSC 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages176-181
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781728138480
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2019
Event3rd International Conference on Smart Grid and Smart Cities, ICSGSC 2019 - Berkeley, United States
Duration: Jun 25 2019Jun 28 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2019 3rd International Conference on Smart Grid and Smart Cities, ICSGSC 2019

Conference

Conference3rd International Conference on Smart Grid and Smart Cities, ICSGSC 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBerkeley
Period06/25/1906/28/19

Funding

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. This manuscript has been authored by UT-Battelle, LLC under Contract No DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the U.S. Department of Energy. The United States Government retains and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the United States Government retains a non-exclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for United States Government purposes. The Department of Energy will provide public access to these results of federally sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan (http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-public-access-plan).

FundersFunder number
LLCDE-AC05-00OR22725
UT-Battelle
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy

    Keywords

    • Nash equilibrium
    • bilevel optimization
    • demand response
    • distribution system operator
    • load aggregator
    • smart grid
    • stackelberg game
    • transactive energy

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