Abstract
It has become a common practice to store sufficiently cooled spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies in interim storage dry casks with passive cooling. These dry casks require nuclear safeguards monitoring because they contain plutonium. Past studies on dry cask modeling and simulations have shown that a remote monitoring system (RMS) situated inside the dry cask could continually monitor and detect the removal of even a single SNF assembly from the cask. This conceptual RMS design was tested by conducting laboratory-scale experiments using small-size 252Cf neutron sources. These small-size sources were surrounded by neutron-reflecting materials in the experiments to mimic the SNF assemblies as a surface neutron source to the fission chamber detectors of the RMS. Experimental and simulation results showed that the removal or diversion of even a single neutron source is detectable within 4 min with a probability of detection greater than 80%.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1511-1521 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Nuclear Technology |
Volume | 208 |
Issue number | 10 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2022 |
Externally published | Yes |
Funding
The authors would like to place on record their highest appreciation for the English language editing and proof-reading assistance provided by Ms. Kelley Holle Ragusa, instructional designer of the Texas A&M Center for Nuclear Security Science and Policy Initiatives.
Keywords
- SNF diversion
- Spent nuclear fuel storage
- dry cask
- neutron source experiments
- nondetection probability