Abstract
How cooperation emerges in human societies is both an evolutionary enigma and a practical problem with tangible implications for societal health. Population structure has long been recognized as a catalyst for cooperation because local interactions facilitate reciprocity. Analysis of population structure typically assumes bidirectional social interactions. But human social interactions are often unidirectional—where one individual has the opportunity to contribute altruistically to another, but not conversely—as the result of organizational hierarchies, social stratification, popularity effects, and endogenous mechanisms of network growth. Here we expand the theory of cooperation in structured populations to account for both uni- and bidirectional social interactions. Even though unidirectional interactions remove the opportunity for reciprocity, we find that cooperation can nonetheless be favored in directed social networks and that cooperation is provably maximized for networks with an intermediate proportion of unidirectional interactions, as observed in many empirical settings. We also identify two simple structural motifs that allow efficient modification of interaction directions to promote cooperation by orders of magnitude. We discuss how our results relate to the concepts of generalized and indirect reciprocity.
Original language | English |
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Article number | e2113468118 |
Journal | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
Volume | 119 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 4 2022 |
Externally published | Yes |
Funding
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Alex McAvoy for substantial intellectual input, as well as the referees and the editor for constructive questions and suggestions. Q.S. was supported by the Simons Foundation (Math+X grant to the University of Pennsylvania) and J.B.P. by the David and Lucille Packard Foundation and The John Templeton Foundation.
Funders | Funder number |
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David and Lucile Packard Foundation | |
Simons Foundation | |
John Templeton Foundation | |
University of Pennsylvania |
Keywords
- Asymmetric relationships
- Cooperation
- Directed graphs
- Evolutionary game theory