Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions

Qi Su, Benjamin Allen, Joshua B. Plotkin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

56 Scopus citations

Abstract

How cooperation emerges in human societies is both an evolutionary enigma and a practical problem with tangible implications for societal health. Population structure has long been recognized as a catalyst for cooperation because local interactions facilitate reciprocity. Analysis of population structure typically assumes bidirectional social interactions. But human social interactions are often unidirectional—where one individual has the opportunity to contribute altruistically to another, but not conversely—as the result of organizational hierarchies, social stratification, popularity effects, and endogenous mechanisms of network growth. Here we expand the theory of cooperation in structured populations to account for both uni- and bidirectional social interactions. Even though unidirectional interactions remove the opportunity for reciprocity, we find that cooperation can nonetheless be favored in directed social networks and that cooperation is provably maximized for networks with an intermediate proportion of unidirectional interactions, as observed in many empirical settings. We also identify two simple structural motifs that allow efficient modification of interaction directions to promote cooperation by orders of magnitude. We discuss how our results relate to the concepts of generalized and indirect reciprocity.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbere2113468118
JournalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Volume119
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 4 2022
Externally publishedYes

Funding

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Alex McAvoy for substantial intellectual input, as well as the referees and the editor for constructive questions and suggestions. Q.S. was supported by the Simons Foundation (Math+X grant to the University of Pennsylvania) and J.B.P. by the David and Lucille Packard Foundation and The John Templeton Foundation.

FundersFunder number
David and Lucile Packard Foundation
Simons Foundation
John Templeton Foundation
University of Pennsylvania

    Keywords

    • Asymmetric relationships
    • Cooperation
    • Directed graphs
    • Evolutionary game theory

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