Estimating the probability of multiple misloads in spent fuel casks for light water reactor systems

Ibrahim Jarrah; Rizwan-Uddin

Estimating the probability of multiple misloads in spent fuel casks for light water reactor systems

Ibrahim Jarrah
, Rizwan-Uddin

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

Abstract

The spent fuel dry cask should remain subcritical under normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The cask may become susceptible to criticality if it is misloaded with assemblies that do not conform with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC). Based on the criticality calculations, the cask needs to be misloaded with more than one fuel assemblies and has an accident in order to become susceptible to criticality. Quantification of the risk of having a misloaded cask may help reduce the conservatism in the cask designs and eliminate unnecessary steps in the spent fuel handling and loading procedure. In this paper, the probability of misloading a cask with more than one light water reactor (PWR and BWR) fuel assemblies is quantified using a combination of event tree and fault trees. An event tree is built to predict all multiple misloads scenarios. Six multiple misloads scenarios are identified from the tree. The probabilities of the six scenarios and the total probability are calculated for casks for both reactor types. The multiple misloads probabilities are found to be 6.73E-07 and 7.55E-06 for PWR and BWR fuels, respectively. In addition, the probability of multiple misloads is calculated as a function of the cask capacity.

Original language	English
Pages	232-241
Number of pages	10
State	Published - 2019
Externally published	Yes
Event	16th International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2019 - Charleston, United States Duration: Apr 28 2019 → May 4 2019

Conference

Conference	16th International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2019
Country/Territory	United States
City	Charleston
Period	04/28/19 → 05/4/19

Funding

The financial support for this project was provided by the United States Department of Energy through the Nuclear Energy University Program under the Contract No. DE-NE0008529. The findings presented herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor. We thank Prof. Zahra Mohaghegh for several constructive comments and for help in estimating the probability of error of repeated tasks (Section IV.B). The financial support for this project was provided by the United States Department of Energy through the Nuclear Energy University Program under the Contract No. DENE0008529. The findings presented herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor. We thank Prof. Zahra Mohaghegh for several constructive comments and for help in estimating the probability of error of repeated tasks (Section IV.B).

Cite this

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title = "Estimating the probability of multiple misloads in spent fuel casks for light water reactor systems",

abstract = "The spent fuel dry cask should remain subcritical under normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The cask may become susceptible to criticality if it is misloaded with assemblies that do not conform with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC). Based on the criticality calculations, the cask needs to be misloaded with more than one fuel assemblies and has an accident in order to become susceptible to criticality. Quantification of the risk of having a misloaded cask may help reduce the conservatism in the cask designs and eliminate unnecessary steps in the spent fuel handling and loading procedure. In this paper, the probability of misloading a cask with more than one light water reactor (PWR and BWR) fuel assemblies is quantified using a combination of event tree and fault trees. An event tree is built to predict all multiple misloads scenarios. Six multiple misloads scenarios are identified from the tree. The probabilities of the six scenarios and the total probability are calculated for casks for both reactor types. The multiple misloads probabilities are found to be 6.73E-07 and 7.55E-06 for PWR and BWR fuels, respectively. In addition, the probability of multiple misloads is calculated as a function of the cask capacity.",

author = "Ibrahim Jarrah and Rizwan-Uddin",

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AU - Rizwan-Uddin,

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N2 - The spent fuel dry cask should remain subcritical under normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The cask may become susceptible to criticality if it is misloaded with assemblies that do not conform with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC). Based on the criticality calculations, the cask needs to be misloaded with more than one fuel assemblies and has an accident in order to become susceptible to criticality. Quantification of the risk of having a misloaded cask may help reduce the conservatism in the cask designs and eliminate unnecessary steps in the spent fuel handling and loading procedure. In this paper, the probability of misloading a cask with more than one light water reactor (PWR and BWR) fuel assemblies is quantified using a combination of event tree and fault trees. An event tree is built to predict all multiple misloads scenarios. Six multiple misloads scenarios are identified from the tree. The probabilities of the six scenarios and the total probability are calculated for casks for both reactor types. The multiple misloads probabilities are found to be 6.73E-07 and 7.55E-06 for PWR and BWR fuels, respectively. In addition, the probability of multiple misloads is calculated as a function of the cask capacity.

AB - The spent fuel dry cask should remain subcritical under normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The cask may become susceptible to criticality if it is misloaded with assemblies that do not conform with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC). Based on the criticality calculations, the cask needs to be misloaded with more than one fuel assemblies and has an accident in order to become susceptible to criticality. Quantification of the risk of having a misloaded cask may help reduce the conservatism in the cask designs and eliminate unnecessary steps in the spent fuel handling and loading procedure. In this paper, the probability of misloading a cask with more than one light water reactor (PWR and BWR) fuel assemblies is quantified using a combination of event tree and fault trees. An event tree is built to predict all multiple misloads scenarios. Six multiple misloads scenarios are identified from the tree. The probabilities of the six scenarios and the total probability are calculated for casks for both reactor types. The multiple misloads probabilities are found to be 6.73E-07 and 7.55E-06 for PWR and BWR fuels, respectively. In addition, the probability of multiple misloads is calculated as a function of the cask capacity.

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T2 - 16th International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2019

Y2 - 28 April 2019 through 4 May 2019

ER -

Estimating the probability of multiple misloads in spent fuel casks for light water reactor systems

Abstract

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