Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence

Poompong Chaiwongkhot; Katanya B. Kuntz; Yanbao Zhang; Anqi Huang; Jean Philippe Bourgoin; Shihan Sajeed; Norbert Lütkenhaus; Thomas Jennewein; Vadim Makarov

doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.99.062315

Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence

Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Katanya B. Kuntz, Yanbao Zhang, Anqi Huang, Jean Philippe Bourgoin, Shihan Sajeed, Norbert Lütkenhaus, Thomas Jennewein, Vadim Makarov

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum-key-distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air's varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve's attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbulence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver or using beam wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eve's attack.

Original language	English
Article number	062315
Journal	Physical Review A
Volume	99
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.99.062315
State	Published - Jun 14 2019
Externally published	Yes

Funding

We thank Ben Davies and Brendon Higgins for assisting with our simulation code and data analysis. This work was funded by the US Office of Naval Research (ONR), Industry Canada, Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI), The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) (Discovery program and CREATE project CryptoWorks21), Canadian Space Agency, Ontario MRIS, and the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia (program NTI center for quantum communications). P.C. was supported by Thai Development and promotion of science and technology teaching project (DPST) scholarship. K.B.K. was supported by Canada First Research Excellence Fund. A.H. was supported by China Scholarship Council.

Funders	Funder number
DPST
Ontario MRIS
Thai Development
Office of Naval Research
Canadian Space Agency
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada	CryptoWorks21
Canada Foundation for Innovation
Industry Canada
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
China Scholarship Council
Canada First Research Excellence Fund

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10.1103/PhysRevA.99.062315

Cite this

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abstract = "The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum-key-distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air's varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve's attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbulence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver or using beam wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eve's attack.",

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AU - Huang, Anqi

AU - Bourgoin, Jean Philippe

AU - Sajeed, Shihan

AU - Lütkenhaus, Norbert

AU - Jennewein, Thomas

AU - Makarov, Vadim

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Eavesdropper's ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence

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