Distributed solution approach for a stackelberg pricing game of aggregated demand response

Yang Chen, Mohammed Olama, Xiao Kou, Kadir Amasyali, Jin Dong, Yaosuo Xue

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

Demand-side management is a fundamental up-to-date strategy that transforms the traditional power grid to a modern smart grid where the flexible pricing mechanisms play a critical role in its successful implementation. In this paper, the pricing-demand response between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the DSO is the price maker that adjusts its strategy based on observed responses from LAs. With the concerns of computational cost and privacy protection, two distributed solution approaches, particle swarm optimization and pattern search algorithm, are investigated and compared with the classical centralized backward induction approach. Numerical results on a small case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed distributed solution approaches in leveraging flexible demand response potential.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2020 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2020
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
ISBN (Electronic)9781728155081
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2 2020
Event2020 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2020 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: Aug 2 2020Aug 6 2020

Publication series

NameIEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
Volume2020-August
ISSN (Print)1944-9925
ISSN (Electronic)1944-9933

Conference

Conference2020 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2020
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period08/2/2008/6/20

Funding

Figure 4. Incremental marginal cost of electricity. B. Experimental Results For the parameter setting of the PSO algorithm, is set to be 0.6 and updated as (0.5 + unif(0,1))/2 in every iteration , 1 = 2 is set to be 1.49 and updated by following the nonlinear acceleration strategy [10]. The maximum allowed iteration number is 100, swarm size is 30, total run time is set to 50. If the best fitness is not improved in consecutive 10 iterations, a random disturbance between [-0.5, 0.5] is added to the current position of each particle to mutate current particles. If the best fitness is not improved in successive 30 iterations, stop the algorithm. The obtained price signals from PSO in 50 runs are shown in Fig. 5, and the corresponding DSO objective values are shown in Fig. 6, where the red line is the optimal objective value $8316.39 obtained from the BI approach; see results summary in Table I. Figure 5. Prices for 50 runs of PSO. Figure 6. DSO objective values for 50 runs of PSO. Since PSA is a direct search method and doesn’t rely on derivative information, its performance greatly depends on the maximum allowable function evaluation number (here, one function evaluation means one complete negotiation process between a DSO and LAs). For instance, the objective iteration is shown in Fig. 7 with function evaluation number of 2000. The final objective value approaches the optimal value after about 40 iterations. The final objective value and solving time are shown in Fig. 8 along with a function evaluation number from 100 to 2000. For comparison purposes, the BI approach is implemented using a non-commercial nonlinear solver SCIP [16]. Both fixed price (FIX) and Time-of-Use (TOU) price structures are tested. The average price in multiple runs are calculated and the best price is picked based on the best objective value for PSO. Overall, as indicated by the price comparison in Fig. 9, the TOU prices are blow the fixed price before 11am and after 23pm, which will motivate LAs to shift demand from relatively peak hours 11am-23pm (see Fig. 2) or high generation cost hours (see Fig. 4) to off-peak hours before 11am. This is supported by the aggregated demand response outcome shown in Fig. 10. Note that this peak-load shifting effect is greatly determined by users’ preference on satisfaction (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 1); small value of before 11am means more load or regulation flexibility, and large value of means that users are reluctant to the price response in that period. Figure 9. Resulted prices from the different solution approaches. Figure 7. Iteration process of PSA with function evaluation number of 2000. Figure 8. DSO objective and computational time of PSA with different function evaluation numbers. Figure 10. Resulted aggregated loads from the different solution approaches. To better compare the different solution approaches, the detailed experimental results are summarized in Table I. The best price for PSO is used, and the function evaluation number is fixed as 2000 for PSA. Compared with fixed price, TOU prices from BI, PSO, and PSA have a lower PAR value and higher overall social welfare (objective sum of DSO and LAs) for one-day operation. The average price for each aggregator ∑∗∙∗,. ∑, provide customers with a lower average price which means is calculated by The BI (TOU) and PSO (Best) they could consume more energy with a similar bill payment and satisfaction level. The average price of PSA is higher than BI and PSO mainly due to the limitation of the function evaluation number. As a centralized approach, BI will need to collect all sensitive information from customers, such as their load profile, satisfaction preference, etc. And its computational cost (solver SCIP) is higher than the distributed algorithms (PSO and PSA), for instance, it takes 300 seconds to reach a relative gap of 2.88% and 600 seconds to reach a relative gap of 2.69% for this small case study. Each iteration in PSO takes about 0.3 seconds for parallel execution and it will need around 30 seconds for max 100 iterations limit. Seen from Fig. 6, it starts to converge around 50 iterations. The solving time for PSA is shown in Fig. 8. Although PSO performs slightly better than PSA in Table I, its performance is not stable due to its stochastic nature and it requires a parameter tuning process and a large number of repetitions. On the other hand, PSA is a deterministic method and its convergence property is guaranteed given enough function evaluations. TABLE I. PROFIT AND COST IN SUMMARY (PRICE: CENT, COST/REVENUE/SATISFACTION: $), (CUSTERMOR SATISFACTION: PEAK PENALTY = 3:1). DSO Level BI (FIX) BI (TOU) PSO (Best) PSA (Final) Peak Load 255.43 243.69 243.72 244.30 PAR Value 1.17 1.09 1.09 1.10 Total Satisfaction 2593.66 2600.74 2600.79 2597.71 DSO Revenue 790.33 780.87 780.70 786.89 DSO Gen. Cost 193.32 193.60 193.67 191.85 DSO Profit 597.01 587.27 587.03 595.03 DSO Objective 8301.39 8316.39 8316.31 8314.90 Aggregator Level BI (FIX) BI (TOU) PSO (Best) PSA (Final) n1 Average Price 15.11 14.63 14.61 14.84 n2 Average Price 15.11 14.57 14.56 14.79 n3 Average Price 15.11 14.76 14.76 15.02 n1 Bill Payment 206.15 203.57 203.48 205.05 n2 Bill Payment 293.70 289.45 289.37 291.59 n3 Bill Payment 290.46 287.85 287.84 290.24 n1 Satisfaction 682.23 684.70 684.71 684.14 n2 Satisfaction 955.92 959.30 959.41 958.35 n3 Satisfaction 955.50 956.73 956.67 955.21 V. CONCLUSION In this paper, a Stackelberg pricing model is formulated for a DSO and LAs, where in the upper level, the DSO maximizes its profit as well as its social obligation to customers, while in the lower level, LAs minimize their electricity bill payment and discomfort. To accelerate the solving process and protect sensitive information, two distributed algorithms, PSO and PSA, are implemented and compared. Numerical results show that the performance of the proposed distributed approaches is in close proximity to the optimal solution. The problem of how the committed aggregated demand response can be allocated to each individual customer will be explored in a future paper. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Building Technology Office under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725. REFERENCES [1] H. Yang, J. zhang, J. Qiu, S. Zhang, M. Lai, and Z. Y. 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Available at: https://scip.zib.de/. [Accessed: 20-Apr-2019]. ACKNOWLEDGMENT This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Building Technology Office under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725.

FundersFunder number
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable EnergyDE-AC05-00OR22725

    Keywords

    • Demand response
    • Distribution system operator
    • Load aggregator
    • Particle swarm
    • Pattern search
    • Smart grid
    • Stackelberg game
    • Transactive energy

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