@inproceedings{802819c203b94f6d8ec4adab8ece60a3,
title = "Auditable privacy: On tamper-evident mix networks",
abstract = "We introduce the notion of tamper-evidence for mix networks in order to defend against attacks aimed at covertly leaking secret information held by corrupted mix servers. This is achieved by letting observers (which need not be trusted) verify the absence of covert channels by means of techniques we introduce herein. Our tamper-evident mix network is a type of re-encryption mixnet in which a server proves that the permutation and re-encryption factors that it uses are correctly derived from a random seed to which the server is committed.",
keywords = "Covert channel, Malware, Mix network, Observer, Subliminal channel, Tamper-evident",
author = "Choi, {Jong Youl} and Philippe Golle and Markus Jakobsson",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1007/11889663_9",
language = "English",
isbn = "3540462554",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
pages = "126--141",
booktitle = "Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 10th International Conference, FC 2006, Revised Selected Papers",
note = "10th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2006 ; Conference date: 27-02-2006 Through 02-03-2006",
}