Abstract
In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all declared uranium hexafluoride cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. The first phase of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at a fuel fabrication facility. A key outcome of the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper provides a description of the UCVS prototype design and an overview of the long-term field trial. Analysis results and interpretation are presented with a focus on the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the assay of over 200 “typical” Type 30B cylinders, and the viability of an “NDA Fingerprint” concept as a high-fidelity means to periodically verify that material diversion has not occurred.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 127-136 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment |
Volume | 874 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 1 2017 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2017 Elsevier B.V.
Funding
This work was supported by the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) ( NN4009030 ) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) program, and the U.S. Support Program (USSP) to the IAEA. The authors are appreciative to Kevin Veal, Karyn Durbin, and Anthony Belian of the NNSA, and Joseph Carbonaro of the USSP for their support and guidance of this project.
Funders | Funder number |
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Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control International Nuclear Safeguards | NA-241 |
U.S. Support Program | |
USSP | |
National Nuclear Security Administration | NN4009030 |
International Atomic Energy Agency |
Keywords
- Nondestructive assay
- Nuclear safeguards
- Uranium enrichment
- Uranium hexafluoride