TY - GEN
T1 - An overview of the 2014 revision of ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014, "nuclear criticality safety in operations with fissionable materials outside reactors"
AU - Bowen, Douglas G.
AU - Brown, Nick
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - A revision to the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) standard, "Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors" [ANSI/ANS-8.1 (ANS-8.1)], was completed and published in 2014. The approved scope for the 2014 revision included two major efforts: (1) an editorial revision to clarify the meaning of the process analysis requirement (PA) and the double contingency principle recommendation (DCP) and (2) the generation of new subcritical limits for uranium and uranium compounds for enrichments less than 10 wt % 235U. After a clarification request was submitted regarding the PA and DCP in 2009, the scope of the revision became focused almost entirely on the editorial revision. With approval from the ANS-8 subcommittee chairman, the computational effort was postponed until the editorial revision could be completed. The 2014 revision of ANS-8.1 involved nuclear criticality safety experts from 14 different sites, each with many years of experience, either maintaining the standard as a working group member or as a criticality safety practitioner. Many of the represented sites had implemented the PA with the language of the DCP to ensure that process operations with fissionable materials would be subcritical. However, the early working group deliberations made it clear that the general industry focus was on the DCP rather than the PA, which requires that "all normal and credible abnormal conditions remain subcritical." Over the course of the revision, two new definitions and a new appendix (Appendix B) were developed to enhance understanding of the PA and DCP. The emphasis of Appendix B is on the requirement for subcriticality (PA) rather than the DCP. The phrase "credible abnormal conditions" in the PA is broader in meaning than "changes in process conditions," as recommended by the DCP. This is because a single credible abnormal condition can potentially affect multiple independent process conditions, and consequently, multiple process parameters, simultaneously. The DCP is a technical practice meant to support the PA and cannot be applied to all situations. However, when it can be properly applied, the DCP technical practice, in most cases, ensures compliance with the PA because two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions are generally judged not to be a credible abnormal condition, as specified in the PA. This paper elaborates on the intense working group discussions over the course of the ANSI/ANS-8.1 standard revision and summarizes the modifications made to the revised standard.
AB - A revision to the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) standard, "Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors" [ANSI/ANS-8.1 (ANS-8.1)], was completed and published in 2014. The approved scope for the 2014 revision included two major efforts: (1) an editorial revision to clarify the meaning of the process analysis requirement (PA) and the double contingency principle recommendation (DCP) and (2) the generation of new subcritical limits for uranium and uranium compounds for enrichments less than 10 wt % 235U. After a clarification request was submitted regarding the PA and DCP in 2009, the scope of the revision became focused almost entirely on the editorial revision. With approval from the ANS-8 subcommittee chairman, the computational effort was postponed until the editorial revision could be completed. The 2014 revision of ANS-8.1 involved nuclear criticality safety experts from 14 different sites, each with many years of experience, either maintaining the standard as a working group member or as a criticality safety practitioner. Many of the represented sites had implemented the PA with the language of the DCP to ensure that process operations with fissionable materials would be subcritical. However, the early working group deliberations made it clear that the general industry focus was on the DCP rather than the PA, which requires that "all normal and credible abnormal conditions remain subcritical." Over the course of the revision, two new definitions and a new appendix (Appendix B) were developed to enhance understanding of the PA and DCP. The emphasis of Appendix B is on the requirement for subcriticality (PA) rather than the DCP. The phrase "credible abnormal conditions" in the PA is broader in meaning than "changes in process conditions," as recommended by the DCP. This is because a single credible abnormal condition can potentially affect multiple independent process conditions, and consequently, multiple process parameters, simultaneously. The DCP is a technical practice meant to support the PA and cannot be applied to all situations. However, when it can be properly applied, the DCP technical practice, in most cases, ensures compliance with the PA because two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions are generally judged not to be a credible abnormal condition, as specified in the PA. This paper elaborates on the intense working group discussions over the course of the ANSI/ANS-8.1 standard revision and summarizes the modifications made to the revised standard.
KW - ANS
KW - ANS-8.1
KW - ANSI
KW - Standards
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84983287318&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84983287318
T3 - ICNC 2015 - International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety
SP - 1622
EP - 1629
BT - ICNC 2015 - International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety
PB - American Nuclear Society
T2 - 2015 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety, ICNC 2015
Y2 - 13 September 2015 through 17 September 2015
ER -