TY - CHAP
T1 - Additive manufacturing (AM) and WMD proliferation
AU - Conant, Andrew
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - Additive manufacturing (AM) or 3D printing technology is a rising industry with applications that traverse all sectors of the economy. A variety of users can use 3D printing commercially or recreationally to make objects in plastic and metal, thus it has caused concern among the nuclear proliferation community in its dual-use capability to help acquisition by non-weapons states or non-state actors. Despite the concern, current AM capabilities give little cause for alarm. What AM possesses in flexibility, it lacks in depth; AM has limitations in size, material strength, and cost of objects compared to traditional manufacturing methods. Spread of sensitive nuclear technologies is not possible with the technology in the near future. Delivery systems are more worrisome yet their actualization probability remains low. The United States and international community should work together to continually examine AM capabilities in the near term and begin to update export control mechanisms, re-examine signatures of proliferation for the intelligence community, and promote collaborative efforts between the AM technical community and the public sector to alert of disruptive ability of the technology.
AB - Additive manufacturing (AM) or 3D printing technology is a rising industry with applications that traverse all sectors of the economy. A variety of users can use 3D printing commercially or recreationally to make objects in plastic and metal, thus it has caused concern among the nuclear proliferation community in its dual-use capability to help acquisition by non-weapons states or non-state actors. Despite the concern, current AM capabilities give little cause for alarm. What AM possesses in flexibility, it lacks in depth; AM has limitations in size, material strength, and cost of objects compared to traditional manufacturing methods. Spread of sensitive nuclear technologies is not possible with the technology in the near future. Delivery systems are more worrisome yet their actualization probability remains low. The United States and international community should work together to continually examine AM capabilities in the near term and begin to update export control mechanisms, re-examine signatures of proliferation for the intelligence community, and promote collaborative efforts between the AM technical community and the public sector to alert of disruptive ability of the technology.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075876751&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-28342-1_4
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-28342-1_4
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85075876751
T3 - Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications
SP - 49
EP - 69
BT - Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications
PB - Springer
ER -