A cyber-security investment game for networked control systems

Pratishtha Shukla; Aranya Chakrabortty; Alexandra Duel-Hallen

doi:10.23919/acc.2019.8815018

A cyber-security investment game for networked control systems

Pratishtha Shukla, Aranya Chakrabortty, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a Network Control System (NCS). We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player, mixed strategy (MS) game, where the attacker attempts to destroy communication equipment of some nodes, and thereby render the LQR feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to degradation of closed-loop performance. The defender, on the other hand, aims to prevent this loss. Both players trade their control performance objectives for the cost of their actions. A Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) of the game represents the allocation of the players' respective resources for attacking or protecting the important network nodes. Numerical results for the New England power system model demonstrate that reliable defense is feasible unless the cost of attack is much smaller than the cost of protection per generator.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	2297-2302
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781538679265
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.23919/acc.2019.8815018
State	Published - Jul 2019
Externally published	Yes
Event	2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019 - Philadelphia, United States Duration: Jul 10 2019 → Jul 12 2019

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the American Control Conference
Volume	2019-July
ISSN (Print)	0743-1619

Conference

Conference	2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019
Country/Territory	United States
City	Philadelphia
Period	07/10/19 → 07/12/19

Funding

This research is partly supported by the US National Science Foundation under grant ECCS 1544871.

Keywords

Cyber-security investment game
Mixed strategy nash equilibrium
Resource allocation

Access to Document

10.23919/acc.2019.8815018

Cite this

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title = "A cyber-security investment game for networked control systems",

abstract = "We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a Network Control System (NCS). We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player, mixed strategy (MS) game, where the attacker attempts to destroy communication equipment of some nodes, and thereby render the LQR feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to degradation of closed-loop performance. The defender, on the other hand, aims to prevent this loss. Both players trade their control performance objectives for the cost of their actions. A Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) of the game represents the allocation of the players' respective resources for attacking or protecting the important network nodes. Numerical results for the New England power system model demonstrate that reliable defense is feasible unless the cost of attack is much smaller than the cost of protection per generator.",

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author = "Pratishtha Shukla and Aranya Chakrabortty and Alexandra Duel-Hallen",

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year = "2019",

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doi = "10.23919/acc.2019.8815018",

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Shukla, P, Chakrabortty, A & Duel-Hallen, A 2019, A cyber-security investment game for networked control systems. in 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019., 8815018, Proceedings of the American Control Conference, vol. 2019-July, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 2297-2302, 2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019, Philadelphia, United States, 07/10/19. https://doi.org/10.23919/acc.2019.8815018

A cyber-security investment game for networked control systems. / Shukla, Pratishtha; Chakrabortty, Aranya; Duel-Hallen, Alexandra.
2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2019. p. 2297-2302 8815018 (Proceedings of the American Control Conference; Vol. 2019-July).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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N2 - We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a Network Control System (NCS). We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player, mixed strategy (MS) game, where the attacker attempts to destroy communication equipment of some nodes, and thereby render the LQR feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to degradation of closed-loop performance. The defender, on the other hand, aims to prevent this loss. Both players trade their control performance objectives for the cost of their actions. A Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) of the game represents the allocation of the players' respective resources for attacking or protecting the important network nodes. Numerical results for the New England power system model demonstrate that reliable defense is feasible unless the cost of attack is much smaller than the cost of protection per generator.

AB - We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a Network Control System (NCS). We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player, mixed strategy (MS) game, where the attacker attempts to destroy communication equipment of some nodes, and thereby render the LQR feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to degradation of closed-loop performance. The defender, on the other hand, aims to prevent this loss. Both players trade their control performance objectives for the cost of their actions. A Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) of the game represents the allocation of the players' respective resources for attacking or protecting the important network nodes. Numerical results for the New England power system model demonstrate that reliable defense is feasible unless the cost of attack is much smaller than the cost of protection per generator.

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A cyber-security investment game for networked control systems

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Keywords

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